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Investigating Unintended Ethical Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 
Where Do We Go From Here? 

Introduction  
In response to accounting failures of unprecedented proportions (e.g., Enron, 
WorldCom, etc.), in 2002 Congress passed and President Bush signed into law one of the 
most sweeping accounting reform bills since the Great Depression of the 1930s: the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX). SOX was intended to restore the public’s confidence in corporate reporting 
(Leone, 2003a).  To achieve this end, the bill contained numerous provisions aimed at 
improving corporate governance, financial disclosure and audits of published financial 
statements.  While the provisions of the law affect multiple constituencies, perhaps no parties 
are more directly impacted than managers of public companies, boards of directors of those 
public companies, and their external auditors. 
As implementation of SOX has gone forward, each of these three groups has 
encountered ethical dilemmas associated not only with certain provisions of the legislation, 
but also with the SEC rules designed to put into action those provisions. The purpose of this 
paper is to highlight some of the unintended ethical consequences associated with SOX. By so 
doing, our paper will identify avenues for future research so that the overall effect and 
effectiveness of SOX can be assessed. 
A review of the major provisions of SOX that impact each of these groups is included 
in the next section, followed by a discussion of the unexpected ethical dilemmas that have 
ensued.  A review of some anecdotal evidence supporting the existence of these dilemmas 




The Major Provisions of SOX 
Managers of Public Companies 
 One of the most talked about provisions of SOX is that which requires CEOs and 
CFOs of public companies to certify both the financial statements and the adequacy of the 
internal control system.  Penalties for false and misleading financial disclosures have been 
increased steeply. First and foremost, federal incarceration is a very real possibility for 
company officers who knowingly certify false financial statements (see, e.g., SOX §906). 
Second, bonuses received by CEOs and CFOs are now subject to forfeiture if the financial 
statements must be restated as a result of “material noncompliance of an issuer” (Conference 
of State Banking Supervisors, 2002). Finally, it is now easier for the SEC to prohibit 
executives associated with improper financial reporting from holding a position as an officer 
or director of a public company in the future.  
 These changes have led to a redefinition of the role of the CFO.  According to the 
Wall Street Journal’s on-line career site, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is reshaping the 
corporate world, but nowhere is it having a greater impact than within the offices of chief 
financial officers” (McGee, 2005a).  CFO.com explains why this is the case: “In the early 
Nineties, with the arrival of powerful financial and enterprise software, CFOs began shucking 
their roles as numbers cop. During that period, enlightened boards of directors began insisting 
that finance chiefs focus less on closing the books, less on accounts receivable, less on the 
general ledger. Instead, they wanted finance chiefs to start zeroing in on top-line initiatives, 
strategic acquisitions (are there any other kind?), and nebulous brand exercises.”  (Leone, 
2003b).  Now, the pendulum has apparently swung back – CFOs are expected to become 
more involved in the details of financial reporting – and there is not likely to be a shift in this 
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priority in the near future as the penalties for improper reporting should be sufficient to 
maintain this focus. 
 
Public Company Boards of Directors 
 In their role at the top of the pyramid of corporate governance, boards of directors also 
feel added pressure from the provisions of SOX.  In September 2003, SEC chairman William 
Donaldson noted that SOX has “helped effect a shift back to strong boards after a period in 
which management influenced many decisions” (BNA, 2003).  Public company boards of 
directors are longer to serve as a mere “rubber stamp” to management, but must actively 
exercise oversight of both management and the external auditors.  To do so, boards of 
directors are faced with the following tasks, as outlined in The CPA Journal (Guerra, 2004):   
• Restructure the board of directors and the audit committee to effectively undertake the 
new responsibilities assigned by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act;  
• Review the structure and operation of the nominating and compensation committees to 
eliminate even the appearance of conflicts of interest;  
• Review existing corporate governance policies to ensure the inclusion of corporate 
governance “best practices”;  
• Eliminate even the appearance of conflicts of interest when dealing with management 
performance and compensation;  
• Decide how to give shareholders direct input into the governance of the corporation; 
and  
• Educate board members in the responsibilities they must fulfill as fiduciaries of the 
stockholders.  
 
As a result of SOX, a number of specific new responsibilities apply to the audit 
committee of the board of directors.  First, the audit committee is required to pre-approve all 
audit and non-audit services to be provided by the external auditor. Second, as more fully 
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discussed below, the audit committee is the recipient of certain required communications from 
the auditor. Third, the board of a public company to disclose whether it has at least one “audit 
committee financial expert” each year, and not only name that expert, but also disclose if s/he 
is independent of management (Beavers, 2003). 
Auditors of Public Companies 
 As noted above, SOX has mandated additional required communication between the 
audit team and the audit committee of the board of directors, including communication of the 
following: 
• Critical accounting policies and practices used in the audit 
• Alternative treatments and their ramifications within GAAP 
• Material written communications between the auditor and senior management of the 
auditee (Conference of State Banking Supervisors, 2002). 
 
Since communication with the audit committee typically falls to the management of 
the audit team, audit partners and managers face added responsibility.  Further, audit team 
personnel are affected by provisions of SOX that relate to partner rotation on audits, and those 
that restrict firms from auditing clients at which certain key positions are filled by persons 
who were previously members of that auditing firm within the past year.   
 Additionally, audit staff are not exempt from the effects of SOX.  Several provisions 
of SOX have changed the way audits are preformed.  For example, SOX places an additional 
burden on the auditor to verify financial disclosures and attest to internal controls, which has 
added to the numbers of hours required for an audit.  Moreover, these changes have increased 
the amount of detail work that needs to be done on each audit.  Together, these changes have 
had the effect of increasing the number of audit personnel needed, especially at staff and 
senior levels.   
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Perhaps the most well known provision of the SOX that affects public accountants is 
the creation of the Public Company Audit Oversight Board (PCAOB).  The PCAOB took 
over the role of issuing audit, attestation and ethics regulations, a role previously filled by the 
American Institute of CPAs.  The PCAOB also disciplines and regulates all auditors of public 
companies.  In addition, the law directed the SEC to report to Congress on the feasibility of 
adopting a principles-based system of accounting regulation.  Thus, the law has the potential 
to change the process of generating not just auditing standards, but the accounting standards 
underlying the auditors’ work as well. 
SOX and private companies 
 While the provisions of SOX apply only to public companies, private companies are 
not immune from the effects of the law.  There are many situations in which private 
companies might want to follow the provisions of SOX. Probably the two most common are if 
a private company: (1) is considering going public in the near future; or (2) expects to be the 
target of a takeover by a public company.  In both of these situations, private companies 
would need to have “audited financials for three years from an independent auditor, 
independent directors, and a functioning, independent board audit committee” (Feigin, 2005) 
and thus would need to have applied the provisions of SOX well in advance of their becoming 
public (whether by public offering or takeover). Additionally, because SOX prohibits loans to 
directors, the existence of such loans is likely to be a concern for nonpublic companies that 




Unintended Ethical Consequences 
Managers of Public Companies 
Arguably, SOX’s most onerous provisions for managers of public companies fall on 
the shoulders of those in the position of CFO.  As outlined above, the expectations and legal 
responsibilities of the CFO have been greatly expanded.  A position that once allowed senior 
accounting types a comfortable role from which to participate in corporate management has 
become what CFO.com describes as a “risk magnet” (Leone, 2003a). At the same time, 
salaries do not appear to have increased commensurate with the increased demands of the job.  
In 2001 (prior to SOX), the median salary for CFOs at companies with annual revenues of 
more than $250 million was about $292,000 (The Todd Organization, 2003, 3). To account 
for inflation, this salary corresponds to a salary of $316,240 in 20051. Yet, in 2005, the 
median salary for CFOs at all companies was just $272,000; and even the 75th percentile 
reached only $354,000 (Salary.com, 2005). 
 Thus, CFOs and potential CFOs must decide whether the benefits of the CFO position 
(e.g., salary, prestige, etc.) are worth the costs (e.g., increased hours and increased risk). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests the benefits may not be outweighing the costs for CFOs and 
potential CFOs alike. For instance, John Detwiler, who, because of a management change, 
recently left the position of CFO at Credence Systems was quoted as saying, “The level of 
scrutiny, second-guessing and review has gone up every quarter [and now], I am definitely 
asking myself whether I want to continue being a CFO of a publicly traded company” (Lohse, 
2005, 1). In the case of potential CFOs, the authors are aware of a handful of candidates that 
                                                 
1 According to the inflation calculator at the Bureau of Labor Statistics website, $292.00 in 2001 has the same 
buying power as $316.24 in 2005 (BLS, 2005). 
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have chosen to forego CFO positions in public companies because of the increased personal 
risk associated with the position.  
Thus, one potential unintended ethical consequence of SOX is the possibility that it is 
contributing to an exodus of qualified CFOs and/or discouraging potential CFOs. As a result, 
SOX may be creating a shortage of qualified CFOs and, unwittingly encouraging less 
qualified individuals to seek out positions as CFOs – positions that those same individuals 
might not have been able to secure in the past. On the other hand, it is possible that SOX will 
serve its intended purpose and encourage only those individuals who believe they have 
sufficient skill and expertise to meet the legislation’s requirements – to seek positions as 
CFOs. 
Additionally, public company management is entrusted with the stewardship of 
company assets.  Yet, compliance costs for SOX have depleted, in some cases, severely, the 
assets with which management is entrusted.  According to a March 2005 study by the 
Financial Executives Institute, SOX compliance costs are 39% higher than those executives 
had estimated in July 2004 that they would be (FEI, 2005).  And, the July 2004 amounts 
exceeded the costs those executives had estimated a year earlier (D’Aquila, 2004).   
What is all the money being spent on?  First, there has been an increase in both 
internal and external audit costs, so much so, that one managing partner of a national firm 
joked, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act should have been called the Full Employment Act for 
CPAs.”  (Telberg, 2005a)  Documentation costs have also risen. 
More telling, however, are the increases in pay to board of directors members, 
consultants to the board of directors and premiums for director and officer (D&O) liability 
insurance.  Board compensation is rising modestly – in one survey, in 2004, director 
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compensation reportedly increased by 14% from the prior year, with more of the 
compensation coming from retainers than meeting fees and stock options (Daum and Neff, 
2005). At the same time, payments to consultants to the board as well as payments for D&O 
insurance have risen sharply since SOX, (D’Aquila, 2004).  In fact, one expert on SOX 
compliance costs estimates that D&O insurance costs have risen 100% for small businesses 
(Loomis, 2002).   
Thus, a second potential unintended ethical consequence of SOX is the possibility that 
it is contributing to management inappropriately spending shareholders’ money (e.g., for 
insurance coverage for board of directors members, for consultants to advise the “experts” on 
the board, etc.). As a result, SOX may be encouraging poor stewardship of company assets by 
management. On the other hand, it is possible that SOX will serve its intended purpose and 
management’s increased spending in the wake of the legislation will help to insulate the 
company from risks and, therefore, better protect company assets. 
 
Board of Directors 
SOX has also brought to the forefront additional requirements for board of directors 
members (including increased involvement and expertise). The result, according to a recent 
survey, “the increased liability and reputational risks of being associated with a poorly 
governed company are causing qualified candidates to carefully consider each directorship” 
(Daum and Neff, 2005, 58). Furthermore, and as discussed previously, SOX prohibits public 
companies from making personal loans, arranging credit or otherwise facilitating loans to 
executive officers and directors. While this provision seems appropriate on paper, specialists 
on D&O liability insurance are concerned that the provision could be construed to apply to 
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“advances of legal fees to directors and executive officers who have been sued for actions 
taken in their capacities as directors and executive officers” (Cervantez & Kirk, 2002).  Since 
most D&O policies do not cover all legal fees, companies normally front money to directors 
and officers to cover the excess of such fees.  If these advances are no longer permitted, 
companies must arrange more costly D&O liability insurance that would cover all legal fees, 
if such a product should be come available, or may be faced with resignations from directors 
and officers who do not want to be exposed to such a risk.   
Thus, board of directors members must decide whether the benefits of the CFO 
position (e.g., salary, prestige, etc.) are worth the costs (e.g., increased hours and increased 
liability). Anecdotal evidence suggests the potential for the costs to outweigh the benefits for 
directors. For instance, since former board members of Enron and Worldcom recently agreed 
(in tentative settlements) to bear personal liability to shareholders in class action lawsuits 
related to their respective companies’ demise, “Some corporate governance observers view 
these cases as an ominous new phase in the push for greater board accountability that could 
cause other investors to seek personal payments from directors in high-profile litigation and 
put a chill on director recruitment and retention” (Directors and Trustees Digest, 2005, 1).  
Thus, a potential unintended ethical consequence of SOX that relates to board of 
directors members is the possibility that the legislation may discourage qualified individuals 
from seeking directorships and/or encourage qualified directors to resign. As a result, SOX 
may be creating a shortage of qualified directors and, unwittingly encouraging less qualified 
individuals to seek out director positions – positions that those same individuals might not 
have been able to secure in the past. On the other hand, it is possible that SOX will serve its 
intended purpose and encourage only qualified individuals to pursue directorships. 
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Auditors of Public Companies 
SOX confirms the need for auditors to have solid analytical skills. Yet, to attract new 
CPAs, the profession for several years has been promoting the “soft skills” necessary for 
success, (see, for example, the core competencies listed in the AICPA’s Vision Project). 
Recruiters have routinely downplayed the detail work required of junior staff members on 
audits.  And, in fact, the amount of detail testing had been greatly reduced prior to SOX, as 
analytic procedures replaced substantive testing to some degree. Now, however, the pendulum 
has swung back towards detailed and time-consuming transaction testing. Indeed, Mcgee 
(2005, B6) reports, “External audits are taking as much as 60% more time to complete.” 
Thus, a fourth potential unintended ethical consequence of SOX is one that relates to 
auditors of public companies. Is SOX creating an environment where less important aspects 
of the profession are being “marketed” to new recruits, resulting in the wrong type of 
individuals entering the profession? In a related vein, where might the audit profession find 
qualified people to do all the additional testing required under SOX, and even more 
importantly, where will it find the people to lead profession forward? This final concern is 
likely exacerbated by the impending retirements of a large number of partners from the Baby 
Boom generation (Telberg, 2005b).   
 
Discussion 
In this section, we suggest avenues for future research that would assist in assessing 
whether the possible unintended ethical consequences of SOX as presented herein are real or 
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merely perceived. As discussed in the conclusion, we believe that this research is necessary in 
order for us to begin to evaluate the effects and effectiveness of SOX. 
Management of Public Companies  
The first possible unintended ethical consequence of SOX is the potential that it may 
be creating a shortage of qualified CFOs and, unwittingly encouraging less qualified 
individuals to seek out positions as CFOs. Or, in the alternative, SOX is serving its intended 
purpose and encouraging only those individuals who believe they have sufficient skills and 
expertise to meet the legislation’s requirements to seek CFO positions. To investigate these 
important issues, future research can certainly conduct surveys of CFOs to assess their 
opinions about the perceived riskiness of their job, whether and the extent to which they 
believe it has changed from the pre- to post-SOX era, their qualifications and experience. 
Similarly, accounting managers below the CFO level can be surveyed to assess the likelihood 
they will pursue CFO positions in their career together with the qualifications and experience 
they believe are necessary and whether they believe there has been a change since SOX. In 
addition, a longitudinal study might also be performed to assess the qualifications and 
experience of CFOs to assess whether – following SOX – changes are occurring over time. 
Finally, future research might consider reviewing CFO changes – for pre- and post-SOX 
periods – to ascertain whether the reasons for CFO changes are tending to differ over time. 
The second potential unintended ethical consequence of SOX is that it may be 
encouraging poor stewardship of company assets by management because of the additional 
spending for insurance coverage, consultants to advise the board of directors, etc. (Or, 
alternatively, that it may serve its intended purpose and better protect company assets by 
insulating them from risks.) To investigate these important issues, researchers might focus on 
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cost-benefit analyses. In particular, researchers might compile the compliance costs of SOX 
and compare them to the benefits of SOX. To do so, cost data might be drawn from 
incremental spending post-SOX for insurance coverage, fees for consultants to advise the 
board of directors, etc. Overall benefits of SOX might be captured with information about the 
incremental (or decremental) number of audit failures in the post-SOX era as compared to 
those in the pre-SOX era. Benefits of SOX particular to specific companies, however, might 
be captured with information about the change in the market value of the companies’ equity. 
Directors of Public Companies  
The third possible unintended ethical consequence of SOX is the potential that it may 
be creating a shortage of qualified directors and, unwittingly encouraging less qualified 
individuals to seek out director positions. (In the alternative, it is possible that SOX will serve 
its intended purpose and encourage only qualified individuals to pursue directorships.) 
Suggestions for investigating these important issues are similar to those for assessing whether 
SOX has resulted in a shortage of qualified CFOs. That is, future research can certainly 
conduct surveys of board of directors members to assess their opinions about the perceived 
riskiness of their job (pre- vs. post-SOX), their qualifications and experience. Similarly, high-
level business executives can be surveyed to assess the likelihood they would take on 
directorships if offered and whether they believe their willingness to serve as a director has 
changed since SOX. In addition, a longitudinal study might also be performed to assess the 
qualifications and experience of board of directors members to assess whether – following 
SOX – changes are occurring over time. Finally, future research might consider reviewing 
board of directors changes – for pre- and post-SOX periods – to ascertain whether the reasons 
for the changes are tending to differ over time. 
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Management of Public Companies  
The fourth possible unintended ethical consequence of SOX is that it may be creating 
an environment where less important aspects of the profession are being “marketed” to new 
recruits, resulting in the wrong type of individuals entering the profession. Future research can 
investigate this important issue by longitudinally studying audit firm turnover and/or the cost 
of recruiting in the post-SOX period. In addition, future research might consider whether audit 




In the post-SOX era, investors expect high-quality financial information. Indeed, the 
provisions of SOX were intended to achieve that objective. Unfortunately, though, Sarbanes-
Oxley is not a perfect solution to the problems that led to the abuses in corporate governance 
and financial reporting that it was meant to address.  As discussed previously, in 
implementing SOX, some unintended ethical consequences have arisen for management, 
directors and auditors. All three groups are faced with new ethical dilemmas. Should 
management hire less qualified CFOs and directors, or spend even more of the shareholders’ 
money on SOX compliance costs? Should individual job seekers: (1) accept jobs as CFOs or 
directors and put their own wealth at risk; (2) accept lower paying, but less risky jobs; or (3) 
leave the field for which they were trained? Should auditing firms facing shortages of 
qualified applicants continue to market the less important aspects of the profession in order to 
attract a larger number of recruits?  
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Do the benefits of SOX outweigh any unintended negative ethical consequences? 
Should SOX be repealed, revised or expanded? Certainly these questions are just the 
beginning. Further debate about the merits of SOX will undoubtedly require a significant 
investment of time and talent and should form the basis of future scholarship. As Jake L. 
Netterville, the chairman of a Louisiana-based regional firm notes, “We must remember that 
Sarbanes-Oxley was passed with great haste and is imperfect at best.  The profession should 
continue its quest to improve on it” (Telberg 2005a). 
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